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Abstract
Recently, Brukner and Zeilinger (2001) have claimed that the Shannon
information is not well defined as a measure of information in quantum
mechanics, adducing arguments that seek to show that it is inextrica-
bly tied to classical notions of measurement. It is shown here that these
arguments do not succeed: the Shannon information does not have prob-
lematic ties to classical concepts. In a further argument, Brukner and
Zeilinger compare the Shannon information unfavourably to their pre-
ferred information measure, I(~p), with regard to the definition of a notion
of ‘total information content’. This argument is found unconvincing and
the relationship between individual measures of information and notions
of ‘total information content’ investigated. We close by considering the
prospects of Zeilinger’s Foundational Principle as a foundational principle
for quantum mechanics
1 Introduction
What role the concept of information might have to play in the foundations
of quantum mechanics is a question that has recently excited renewed interest
(Fuchs 2000, 2002; Mermin 2001; Wheeler 1990). Zeilinger, for example, has put
forward an information-theoretic principle which he suggests might serve as a
foundational principle for quantum mechanics (Zeilinger 1999),(see Appendix).
As a part of this project, Brukner and Zeilinger (2001) have criticised Shannon’s
(1948) measure of information, the quantity fundamental to the discussion of
information in both classical and quantum information theory. They claim that
the Shannon information is not appropriate as a measure of information in the
quantum context and have proposed in its stead their own preferred quantity
and a notion of ‘total information content’ associated with it, which latter is
supposed to supplant the von Neumann entropy (Brukner and Zeilinger 1999,
2000a, 2000b).
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The main aim in Brukner and Zeilinger (2001) is to establish that the Shan-
non information is intimately tied to classical notions, in particular, to the pre-
conceptions of classical measurement, and that in consequence it cannot serve
as a measure of information in the quantum context. They seek to establish
this in two ways. First, by arguing that the Shannon measure only makes sense
when we can take there to be a pre-existing sequence of bit values in a message
we are decoding, which is not the case in general for measurements on quantum
systems (consider measurements on qubits in a basis different from their eigen-
basis); and second, by suggesting that Shannon’s famous third postulate, the
postulate that secures the uniqueness of the form of the Shannon information
measure (Shannon, 1948) and has been seen by many as a necessary axiom for
a measure of information, is motivated by classical preconceptions and does not
apply in general in quantum mechanics where we must consider non-commuting
observables.
These two arguments do not succeed in showing that the Shannon informa-
tion is ‘intimately tied to the notion of systems carrying properties prior to and
independent of observation’(Brukner and Zeilinger 2000b:1), however. The first
is based on too narrow a conception of the meaning of the Shannon information
and the second, primarily, on a misreading of what is known as the ‘grouping
axiom’. We shall see that the Shannon information is perfectly well defined and
appropriate as a measure of information in the quantum context as well as in
the classical. We will begin by reviewing some of the different ways in which
the Shannon information may be understood (Section 2), before examining this
pair of arguments and seeing where they go wrong (Section 3).
Brukner and Zeilinger have a further argument against the Shannon infor-
mation (Section 4). They suggest it is inadequate because it cannot be used to
define an acceptable notion of ‘total information content’. Equally, they insist,
the von Neumann entropy cannot be a measure of information content for a
quantum system because it has no general relation to information gain from
the measurements that we might perform on a system, save in the case of mea-
surement in the basis in which the density matrix is diagonal. By contrast, for
a particular set of measurements, their preferred information measure sums to
a unitarily invariant quantity that they interpret as ‘information content’, this
being one of their primary reasons for adopting this specific measure. This prop-
erty will be seen to have a simple geometric explanation in the Hilbert-Schmidt
representation of density operators however, rather than being of any great in-
formation theoretic significance; and this final argument found unpersuasive, as
the proposed constraint on any information measure regarding the definition
of ‘total information content’ seems unreasonable. Part of the problem is that
information content, total or otherwise, is not a univocal concept and we need
to be careful to specify precisely what we might mean by it in any given context.
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2 Interpretation of the Shannon information
The technical concept of information relevant to our discussion, the Shannon
information, finds its home in the context of communication theory. We are
concerned with a notion of quantity of information; and the notion of quantity
of information is cashed out in terms of the resources required to transmit
messages (which is, note, a very limited sense of quantity). We shall highlight
two main ways in which the Shannon information may be understood, the first
of which rests explicitly on Shannon’s 1948 noiseless coding theorem.
2.1 The communication channel
It is instructive to begin with a quotation of Shannon’s:
The fundamental problem of communication is that of reproducing
at one point either exactly or approximately a message selected at
another point. Frequently these messages have meaning...These se-
mantic aspects of communication are irrelevant to the engineering
problem. (Shannon 1948: 31)
The communication system consists of an information source, a transmitter or
encoder, a (possibly noisy) channel, and a receiver (decoder). It must be able
to deal with any possible message produced (a string of symbols selected in the
source, or some varying waveform), hence it is quite irrelevant whether what is
actually transmitted has any meaning or not.
It is crucial to realise that ‘information’ in Shannon’s theory is not associated
with individual messages, but rather characterises the source of the messages.
The point of characterising the source is to discover what capacity is required
in a communications channel to transmit all the messages the source produces;
and it is for this that the concept of the Shannon information is introduced.
The idea is that the statistical nature of a source can be used to reduce the
capacity of channel required to transmit the messages it produces (we shall
restrict ourselves to the case of discrete messages for simplicity).
Consider an ensemble X of letters {x1, x2, . . . , xn} occurring with proba-
bilities pi. This ensemble is our source, from which messages of N letters are
drawn. We are concerned with messages of very large N . For such messages,
we know that typical sequences of letters will contain Npi of letter xi, Npj of
xj and so on. The number of distinct typical sequences of letters is then given
by
N !
Np1!Np2! . . . Npn!
and using Stirling’s approximation, this becomes 2NH(X) where
H(X) = −
n∑
i=1
pi log pi (1)
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is the Shannon information (logarithms are to base 2 to fix the units of infor-
mation as binary bits).
Now as N →∞, the probability of an atypical sequence appearing becomes
negligible and we are left with only 2NH(X) equiprobable typical sequences which
need ever be considered as possible messages. We can thus replace each typical
sequence with a binary code number ofNH(X) bits and send that to the receiver
rather than the original message of N letters (N logn bits).
The message has been compressed from N letters to NH(X) bits (≤ N logn
bits). Shannon’s noiseless coding theorem, of which this is a rough sketch, states
that this represents the optimal compression (Shannon 1948). The Shannon
information is, then, appropriately called a measure of information because it
represents the maximum amount that messages consisting of letters drawn from
an ensemble X can be compressed.
One may also make the derivative statement that the information per letter
in a message is H(X) bits, which is equal to the information of the source.
But ‘derivative’ is an important qualification: we can only consider a letter xi
drawn from an ensemble X to have associated with it the information H(X) if
we consider it to be a member of a typical sequence of N letters, where N is
large, drawn from the source.
Note also that we must strenuously resist any temptation to conclude that
because the Shannon information tells us the maximum amount a message
drawn from an ensemble can be compressed, that it therefore tells us the ir-
reducible meaning content of the message, specified in bits, which somehow
possess their own intrinsic meaning. This idea rests on a failure to distinguish
between a code, which has no concern with meaning, and a language, which
does (cf. Timpson (2000), Chpt.5).
2.2 Information and Uncertainty
Another way of thinking about the Shannon information is as a measure of the
amount of information that we expect to gain on performing a probabilistic ex-
periment. The Shannon measure is a measure of the uncertainty of a probability
distribution as well as serving as a measure of information. A measure of un-
certainty is a quantitative measure of the lack of concentration of a probability
distribution; this is called an uncertainty because it measures our uncertainty
about what the outcome of an experiment completely described by the prob-
ability distribution in question will be. Uffink (1990) provides an axiomatic
characterisation of measures of uncertainty, deriving a general class of measures
of which the Shannon information is one (see also Maassen and Uffink 1989).
Imagine a truly random probabilistic experiment described by a probabil-
ity distribution ~p = {p1, . . . , pn}. The intuitive link between uncertainty and
information is that the greater the uncertainty of this distribution, the more
we stand to gain from learning the outcome of the experiment. In the case of
the Shannon information, this notion of how much we gain can be made more
precise.
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Some care is required when we ask ‘how much do we know about the out-
come?’ for a probabilistic experiment. In a certain sense, the shape of the
probability distribution might provide no information about what an individual
outcome will actually be, as any of the outcomes assigned non-zero probability
can occur. However, we can use the probability distribution to put a value on
any given outcome. If it is a likely one, then it will be no surprise if it occurs
so of little value; if an unlikely one, it is a surprise, hence of higher value. A
nice measure for the value of the occurrence of outcome i is − log pi, a decreas-
ing function of the probability of the outcome. We may call this the ‘surprise’
information associated with outcome i; it measures the value of what we learn
from the experiment given that we know the probability distribution for the
outcomes.
If the information that we would gain if outcome i were to occur is − log pi,
then before the experiment, the amount of information we expect to gain is given
by the expectation value of the ‘surprise’ information,
∑
i pi(− log pi); and this,
of course, is just the Shannon information H of the probability distribution ~p.
Hence the Shannon information tells us our expected information gain.
More generally, a crude sketch of how the relationship between uncertainty
and expected information gain might be cashed out for the whole class of mea-
sures of uncertainty may be given as follows. What we know given the proba-
bility distribution for an experiment is that if the experiment is repeated very
many times then the sequence of outcomes we attain will be one of the typical
sequences. How much we learn from actually performing the experiments and
acquiring one of those sequences, then, will depend on the number of typical se-
quences; the more there are, the more we stand to gain. Thus for a quantitative
measure of how much information we gain from the sequence of experiments we
could just count the number of typical sequences (which would give us NH , the
Shannon information of the sequence), or we could choose any suitably behaved
function (e.g. continuous, invariant under relabelling of the outcome probabili-
ties) that increases as the number of typical sequences increases. This property
will follow from Schur concavity, which is the key requirement on Uffink’s gen-
eral class of uncertainty measures Ur(~p) (for details of the property of Schur
concavity, see Uffink (1990), Nielsen (2001) and Section 4.1 below). NUr(~p)
then, can be understood as a measure of the amount of information we gain
from a long series N of experiments; we get the average or expected informa-
tion per measurement by dividing by N , but note that this quantity only makes
sense if we consider the individual measurement as part of a long sequence of
measurements.
A precisely similar story can be told for a measure of ‘how much we know’
given a probability distribution. This will be the inverse of an uncertainty: we
want a measure of the concentration of a probability distribution; the more
concentrated, the more we know about what the outcome will be (which just
means, the better we can predict the outcome). A function that decreases
as the number of typical sequences increases (Schur convexity) will give our
quantitative measure of how much we know about what the outcome of a long
run of experiments will be: the more typical sequences there are the less we
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know. We are again talking of a long run of experiments, so ‘how much we
know’ for a single experiment will only make sense as an average value, when
the single experiment is considered as a member of a long sequence. So note
again that to say we have a certain amount of information (knowledge) about
what the outcome of an experiment will be is not to claim that we have partial
knowledge of some predetermined fact about the outcome of an experiment.
2.3 The minimum number of questions needed to specify
a sequence
The final common interpretation of the Shannon information is as the minimum
average number of binary questions needed to specify a sequence drawn from
an ensemble (Uffink 1990; Ash 1965), although this appears not to provide an
interpretation of the Shannon information actually independent of the previous
two.
Imagine that a long sequence N of letters is drawn from the ensemble X , or
that N independent experiments whose possible outcomes have probabilities pi
are performed, but the list of outcomes is kept from us. Our task is to determine
what the sequence is by asking questions to which the guardian of the sequence
can only answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’; and we choose to do so in such a manner as to
minimize the average number of questions needed. We need to be concerned
with the average number to rule out lucky guesses identifying the sequence.
If we are trying to minimize the average number of questions, it is evident
that the best questioning strategy will be one that attempts to rule out half
the possibilities with each question, for then whatever the answer turns out to
be, we still get the maximum value from each question. Given the probability
distribution, we may attempt to implement this strategy by dividing the possible
outcomes of each individual experiment into classes of equal probability, and
then asking whether or not the outcome lies in one of these classes. We then
try and repeat this process, dividing the remaining set of possible outcomes into
two sets of equal probabilities, and so on. It is in general not possible to proceed
in this manner, dividing a finite set of possible outcomes into two sets of equal
probabilities, and it can be shown that in consequence the average number
of questions required if we ask about each individual experiment in isolation
is greater than or equal to H(X). However, if we consider the N repeated
experiments, where N tends to infinity, and consider asking joint questions
about what the outcomes of the independent experiments were, we can always
divide the classes of possibilities of (joint) outcomes in the required way. Now we
already know that for large N , there are 2NH(X) typical sequences, so given that
we can strike out half the possible sequences with each question, the minimum
average number of questions needed to identify the sequence is NH(X). (These
last results are again essentially the noiseless coding theorem.)
It is not immediately obvious, however, why the minimum average number
of questions needed to specify a sequence should be related to the notion of
information. (Again, the tendency to think of bits and binary questions as
irreducible meaning elements is to be resisted.) It seems, in fact that this is
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either just another way of talking about the maximum amount that messages
drawn from a given ensemble can be compressed, in which case we are back to
the interpretation of the Shannon information in terms of the noiseless coding
theorem, or it is providing a particular way of characterising how much we stand
to gain from learning a typical sequence, and we return to an interpretation in
terms of our expected information gain.
3 Two arguments against the Shannon informa-
tion
With this preamble behind us, we may turn to the first of the arguments against
the Shannon information.
3.1 Are pre-existing bit-values required?
Since the quantity −∑i pi log pi is meaningful for any (discrete) probability
distribution (and can be generalised for continuous distributions), Brukner and
Zeilinger’s argument must be that when we have probabilities arising from mea-
surements on quantum systems, −∑i pi log pi does not correspond to a concept
of information. Their argument concerns measurements on systems that are
all prepared in a given state |ψ〉, where |ψ〉 may not be an eigenstate of the
observable we are measuring. The probability distribution ~p = {p1, . . . , pn} for
measurement outcomes will be given by pi = Tr(|ψ〉〈ψ|Pi), where Pi are the op-
erators corresponding to different measurement outcomes (projection operators
in the spectral decomposition of the observable, for projective measurements).
Brukner and Zeilinger suggest that the Shannon information has no meaning
in the quantum case, because the concept lacks an ‘operational definition’ in
terms of the number of binary questions needed to specify an actual concrete
sequence of outcomes. In general in a sequence of measurements on quantum
systems, we cannot consider there to be a pre-existing sequence of possessed
values, at least if we accept the orthodox eigenvalue-eigenstate link for the
ascription of definite values (see e.g. Bub (1997))1, and this rules out, they
insist, interpreting the Shannon measure as an amount of information:
The nonexistence of well-defined bit values prior to and indepen-
dent of observation suggests that the Shannon measure, as defined
by the number of binary questions needed to determine the partic-
ular observed sequence 0’s and 1’s, becomes problematic and even
1In a footnote, Brukner and Zeilinger suggest that the Kochen-Specker theorem in partic-
ular raises problems for the operational definition of the Shannon information. It is not clear,
however, why the impossibility of assigning context independent yes/no answers to questions
asked of the system should be a problem if we are considering an operational definition. Pre-
sumably such a definition would include a concrete specification of the experimental situation,
i.e. refer to the context, and then we are not concerned with assigning a value to an operator
but to the outcome of a specified experimental procedure, and this can be done perfectly con-
sistently, if we so wish. The de-Broglie Bohm theory, of course, provides a concrete example
(Bell 1982).
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untenable in defining our uncertainty as given before the measure-
ments are performed. (Brukner and Zeilinger 2001:1)
...No definite outcomes exist before measurements are performed and
therefore the number of different possible sequences of outcomes does
not characterize our uncertainty about the individual system before
measurements are performed. (Brukner and Zeilinger 2001:3)
These two statements should immediately worry us, however. Recall the key
points of the interpretation of the Shannon information: given a long message
(a long run of experiments), we know that it will be one of the typical sequences
that is instantiated. Given ~p, we can say what the typical sequences will be,
how many there are, and hence the number of bits (NH(X)) needed to spec-
ify them, independent of whether or not there is a pre-existing sequence of bit
values. It is irrelevant whether there already is some concrete sequence of bits
or not; all possible sequences that will be produced will require the same num-
ber of bits to specify them as any sequence produced will always be one of the
typical sequences. It clearly makes no difference to this whether the probability
distribution is given classically or comes from the trace rule. Also, the number
of different possible sequences does indeed tell us about our uncertainty before
measurement: what we know is that one of the typical sequences will be instan-
tiated, what we are ignorant of is which one it will be, and we can put a measure
on how ignorant we are simply by counting the number of different possibili-
ties. Brukner and Zeilinger’s attempted distinction between uncertainty before
and after measurement is not to the point, the uncertainty is a function of the
probability distribution and this is perfectly well defined before measurement2.
Brukner and Zeilinger have assumed that it is a necessary and sufficient
condition to understand H as a measure of information that there exists some
concrete string of N values, for then and only then can we talk of the minimum
number of binary questions needed to specify the string. But as we have now
seen, it is not a necessary condition that there exist such a sequence of outcomes.
We are not in any case forced to assume that H is about the number of
questions needed to specify a sequence in order to understand it as a measure of
information; we also have the interpretations in terms of the maximum amount
a message drawn from an ensemble described by the probability distribution
~p can be compressed, and as the expected information gain on measurement.
(And as we have seen, one of these two interpretations must in fact be prior.)
Furthermore, the absence of a pre-existing string need not even be a problem
for the minimum average questions interpretation — we can ask about the
minimum average number of questions that would be required if we were to
have a sequence drawn from the ensemble. So again, the pre-existence of a
definite string of values is not a necessary condition.
It is not a sufficient condition either, because, faced with a string of N
2We may need to enter at this point the important note that the Shannon information is
not supposed to describe our general uncertainty when we know the state, this is a job for a
measure of mixedness such as the von Neumann entropy, see below.
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definite outcomes, in order to interpret NH as the minimum average number
of questions needed to specify the sequence, we need to know that we in fact
have a typical sequence, that is, we need to imagine an ensemble of such typical
sequences and furthermore, to assume that the relative frequencies of each of
the outcomes in our actual string is representative of the probabilities of each
of the outcomes in the notional ensemble from which the sequence is drawn.
If we do not make this assumption, then the minimum number of questions
needed to specify the state of the sequence must be N — we cannot imagine
that the statistical nature of the source from which the sequence is notionally
drawn allows us to compress the message. So even in the classical case, the
concrete sequence on its own is not enough and we need to consider an ensemble,
either of typical sequences or an ensemble from which the concrete sequence is
drawn. In this respect the quantum and classical cases are completely on a
par. The same assumption needs to be made in both cases, namely, that the
probability distribution ~p, either known in advance, or derived from observed
relative frequencies, correctly describes the probabilities of the different possible
outcomes. The fact that no determinate sequence of outcomes exists before
measurement does not pose any problems for the Shannon information in the
quantum context.
Reiterating their requirements for a satisfactory notion of information, Brukner
and Zeilinger say:
We require that the information gain be directly based on the ob-
served probabilities, (and not, for example, on the precise sequence
of individual outcomes observed on which Shannon’s measure of in-
formation is based). (Brukner and Zeilinger 2000b:1)
But as we have seen, it is false that the Shannon measure must be based on a
precise sequence of outcomes (this is not a necessary condition) and the Shannon
measure already is and must be based on the observed probabilities (a sequence
of individual outcomes on its own is not sufficient).
There is, however, a difference between the quantum and classical cases
that Brukner and Zeilinger may be attempting to capture. Suppose we have
a sequence of N qubits that has actually been used to encode some informa-
tion, that is, the sequence of qubits is a channel to which we have connected
a classical information source. For simplicity, imagine that we have coded in
orthogonal states. Then the state of the sequence of qubits will be a prod-
uct of |0〉’s and |1〉’s and for measurements in the encoding basis, the sequence
will have a Shannon information equal to NH(A) where H(A) is the infor-
mation of the classical source. If we do not measure in the encoding basis,
however, the sequence of 0’s and 1’s we get as our outcomes will differ from
the values originally encoded and the Shannon information of the resulting se-
quence will be greater than that of the original3. We have introduced some
3We may think of our initial sequence of qubits as forming an ensemble described by the
density operator ρ = p1|0〉〈0| + p2|1〉〈1|, where p1, p2 are the probabilities for 0 and 1 in our
original classical information source. Any (projective) measurement that does not project
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‘noise’ by measuring in the wrong basis. The way we describe this sort of sit-
uation, though (Schumacher 1995), is to use the Shannon mutual information
H(A : B) = H(A)−H(A|B), where B denotes the outcome of measurement of
the chosen observable (outcomes bi with probabilities p(bi)) and the ‘conditional
entropy’ H(A|B) =∑ni=1 p(bi)H(p(a1|bi), . . . , p(am|bi)), characterises the noise
we have introduced by measuring in the wrong basis. H(B) is the information
(per letter) of the sequence that we are left with after measurement, H(A : B)
tells us the amount of information that we have actually managed to transmit
down our channel, i.e. the amount (per letter) that can be decoded when we
measure in the wrong basis.
3.2 The grouping axiom
The first argument has not revealed any difficulties for the Shannon information
in the quantum context, so let us now turn to the second.
In his original paper, Shannon put forward three properties as reasonable
requirements on a measure of uncertainty and showed that the only function
satisfying these requirements has the form H = −K∑i pi log pi.4
The first two requirements are that H should be continuous in the pi and
that for equiprobable events (pi = 1/n), H should be a monotonic increasing
function of n. The third requirement is the strongest and the most important
in the uniqueness proof. It states that if a choice is broken down into two
successive choices, the original H should be a weighted sum of the individual
values of H . The meaning of this rather non-intuitive constraint is usually
demonstrated with an example (see Fig. 1). A precise statement of Shannon’s
third requirement (one that includes also the second requirement as a special
case) is due to Faddeev (1957) and is often known as the Faddeev grouping
axiom:
Grouping Axiom 1 (Faddeev) For every n ≥ 2
H(p1, p2, . . . , pn−1, q1, q2) = H(p1, . . . , pn−1, pn) + pnH(
q1
pn
,
q2
pn
) (2)
where pn = q1 + q2.
The form of the Shannon information follows uniquely from requiringH(p, 1−p)
to be continuous for 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 and positive for at least one value of p, permu-
tation invariance of H with respect to relabelling of the pi, and the grouping
axiom.
onto the eigenbasis of ρ will result in a post-measurement ensemble that is more mixed than
ρ (see e.g. Nielsen (2001), Peres (1995) and below) and hence will have a greater uncertainty,
thus a greater Shannon information, or any other measure of information gain.
4In contrast to some later writers, however, notably Jaynes (1957), he set little store
by this derivation, seeing the justification of his measure as lying rather in its implications
(Shannon 1948). Save the noiseless coding theorem, the most significant of the implications
that Shannon goes on to draw are, as has been pointed out by Uffink, consequences of the
property of Schur concavity and hence shared by the general class of measures of uncertainty
derived in Uffink (1990).
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Figure 1: The probability distribution ~p = { 12 , 13 , 16} can be considered as
given for the three outcomes directly, or we could consider first a choice of two
equiprobable events, followed by a second choice of two events with probabilities
2
3 ,
1
3 , conditional on the second, say, of the first two events occurring, a ‘decom-
position’ of a single choice into two successive choices, the latter of which will
only be made half the time. Shannon’s third requirement says that the uncer-
tainty in ~p will be given by H(12 ,
1
3 ,
1
6 ) = H(
1
2 ,
1
2 )+
1
2H(
2
3 ,
1
3 ): the uncertainty of
the overall choice is equal to the uncertainty of the first stage of the choice, plus
the uncertainty of the second choice weighted by its probability of occurrence.
‘Grouping axiom’ is an appropriate name. As it is standardly understood
(see e.g. Ash (1965), Uffink (1990), Jaynes (1957)), we consider that instead
of giving the probabilities p1, . . . , pn of the outcomes x1, . . . , xn of a probabilis-
tic experiment directly, we may imagine grouping the outcomes into composite
events (whose probabilities will be given by the sum of the probabilities of their
respective component events), and then specifying the probabilities of the out-
come events conditional on the occurrence of the composite events to which
they belong; this way of specifying the probabilistic experiment being precisely
equivalent to the first. So we might group the first k events together into an
event A, which would have a probability p(A) =
∑k
i=1 pi, and the remaining
n− k into an event B of probability p(B) =∑ni=k+1 pi; and then give the con-
ditional probabilities of the events x1, . . . , xk conditional on composite event A
occurring, (p1/p(A)), . . . , (pk/p(A)), and similarly the conditional probabilities
for the events xk+1, . . . , xn conditional on event B. The grouping axiom then
concerns how the uncertainty measures should be related for these different de-
scriptions of the same probabilistic experiment. It says that our uncertainty
about which event will occur should be equal to our uncertainty about which
group it will belong to plus the expected value of the uncertainty that would
remain if we were to know which group it belonged to (this expected value be-
ing the weighted sum of the uncertainties of the conditional distributions, with
weights given by the probability of the outcome lying within a given group).
So in particular, let us imagine an experiment with n+1 outcomes which we
label a1, a2, . . . , an−1, b1, b2, having probabilities p1, . . . , pn−1, q1, q2 respectively.
We can define an event an = b1 ∪ b2, b1 ∩ b2 = ∅, which would have probability
pn = q1+ q2 and the probabilities for b1 and b2 conditional on an occurring will
then be q1
pn
, q2
pn
respectively. Grouping Axiom 1 says that the uncertainty in the
occurrence of events a1, a2, . . . , an−1, b1, b2 is equal to the uncertainty for the
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occurrence of events a1, . . . , an plus the uncertainty for the occurrence of b1, b2
conditional on an occurring, weighted by the probability that an should occur.
Brukner and Zeilinger suggest that the grouping axiom, however, embodies
certain classical presumptions that do not apply in quantum mechanics. This
entails that the axiomatic derivation of the form of the Shannon measure does
not go through and that the Shannon information ceases to be a measure of
uncertainty in the quantum context. The argument turns on their interpretation
of the grouping axiom, which differs from the standard interpretation in that it
refers to joint experiments.
3.2.1 Brukner and Zeilinger’s interpretation
If we take an experiment, A, with outcomes a1, . . . , an and probabilities
(p(a1), . . . , p(an)) = (p1, . . . , pn) and an experiment, B, with outcomes b1, b2,
then for the joint experiment A ∧ B, the event an is the union of the two
disjoint events an ∧ b1 and an ∧ b2. Let us assign to these two events the
probabilities q1 and q2 respectively. Then p(an) = p(an ∧ b1) + p(an ∧ b2) =
q1 + q2 = pn. On this interpretation, the left hand side of Grouping Axiom 1 is
to be understood as denoting the uncertainty in the experiment with outcomes
a1, a2, . . . , an−1, an ∧ b1, an ∧ b2.
If an occurs, the conditional probabilities for b1, b2 will be p(an∧b1)/p(an) =
q1/pn, p(an∧b2)/p(an) = q2/pn respectively, and soH( q1pn ,
q2
pn
) is the uncertainty
in the value of B given that an occurs.
The grouping axiom can now be rewritten as:
Grouping Axiom 2 (Brukner and Zeilinger)
H (p(a1), p(a2), . . . , p(an−1), p(an ∧ b1), p(an ∧ b2))
= H (p(a1), p(a2), . . . , p(an)) + p(an)H (p(b1|an), p(b2|an)) . (3)
Generalizing to the case in which we have m outcomes for experiment B and
distinguish B values for all n A outcomes, so that we have mn outcomes ai∧ bj ,
the grouping axiom becomes:
Grouping Axiom 3 (Brukner and Zeilinger)
H(A ∧B) = H(A) +H(B|A)
From the point of view of Shannon’s original presentation, this expression ap-
pears as a theorem rather than an axiom, being a consequence of the logarithmic
form of the Shannon information and the definition of the conditional entropy.
3.2.2 The inapplicability argument
The classical assumptions made explicit, Brukner and Zeilinger suggest, in
Grouping Axioms 2 and 3 are that attributes corresponding to all possible mea-
surements can be assigned to a system simultaneously (in this case, ai, bj and
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ai ∧ bj); and that measurements can be made ideally non-disturbing. Group-
ing Axiom 3, for example, is supposed to express the fact that classically, the
information we expect to gain from a joint experiment A ∧ B, is the same as
the information we expect to gain from first performing A, then performing B
(where the uncertainty in B is updated conditional on the A outcome, but our
ability to predict B outcomes is not degraded by the A measurement).
Their inapplicability argument is simply that as the grouping axiom requires
us to consider joint experiments, the uniqueness proof for the Shannon informa-
tion will fail in the quantum context, because we can consider measurements of
non-commuting observables and the joint probabilities on the left hand side of
Grouping Axiom 2 will not be defined for such observables; thus the grouping
axiom will fail to hold. Furthermore, the grouping axiom shows that the Shan-
non information embodies classical assumptions, so the Shannon measure will
not be justified as a measure of uncertainty because these assumptions do not
hold in the quantum case. The result is that
...only for the special case of commuting, i.e., simultaneously definite
observables, is the Shannon measure of information applicable and
the use of the Shannon information justified to define the uncertainty
given before quantum measurements are performed. (Brukner and
Zeilinger 2001:4, my emphasis)
This argument is problematic, however. Let us begin with the obvious point
that a failure of the argument for uniqueness does not automatically rule out
the Shannon information as a measure of uncertainty. In fact, the Shannon
information can be seen as one of a general class of measures of uncertainty,
characterised by a set of axioms in which the grouping axiom does not appear
(Uffink 1990), hence the grouping axiom is not necessary for the interpretation
of the Shannon information as a measure of uncertainty. (Uffink in fact has
previously argued that the grouping axiom is not a natural constraint on a
measure of information and should not be imposed as a necessary constraint,
even in the classical case (Uffink 1990, §1.6.3).) So from the fact that on the
Brukner/Zeilinger reading, the grouping axiom seems to embody some classical
assumptions that do not hold in the quantum case, it does not follow that the
concept of the Shannon information as a measure of uncertainty involves those
classical assumptions.
Furthermore, Brukner and Zeilinger’s grouping axiom is not in fact equiva-
lent to the standard form and the standard form is equally applicable in both
the classical and quantum cases. Thus the Shannon information has not been
shown to involve classical assumptions and the standard axiomatic derivation
can indeed go through in the quantum context. The probabilities appearing in
Grouping Axiom 1 are well defined in both the classical and quantum cases.
In Brukner and Zeilinger’s notation, Grouping Axiom 1 would be written as
H(p(a1), p(a2), . . . , p(an−1), p(b1), p(b2))
= H(p(a1), . . . , p(an−1), p(b1 ∨ b2))
+ p(b1 ∨ b2)H(p(b1|b1 ∨ b2), p(b2|b1 ∨ b2)) (4)
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Figure 2: a) in Grouping Axiom 1 and eqn. (4), the ‘B’ outcomes b1 and b2
cannot occur without an
def
= b1 ∪ b2 occurring. b) in the joint experiment
scenario, b1 or b2 can occur without an occurring, but this is made to appear
the same by coarse graining the joint experiment and only recording B values
when we get A outcome an.
This refers to an experiment with n+1 outcomes labelled by a1, . . . an−1, b1, b2
and the grouping of two of these outcomes together, and is clearly different
from Grouping Axiom 2 (see Fig. 2). Brukner and Zeilinger’s Grouping Axiom
2 is the result of applying (4) to a coarse grained joint experiment in which
we only distinguish the B outcomes of A ∧B for A outcome an, and Grouping
Axiom 3 is the result of applying the simple grouping axiom to the fine grained
joint experiment n times. These are not, then, expressions of the grouping
axiom, but rather demonstrate its effect when actually applied to an already well
defined joint probability distribution. The absence of certain joint probability
distributions in quantum mechanics does not, however, affect the meaningfulness
of the grouping axiom, because in its proper formulation it does not refer to joint
experiments5 . (Note that if the outcomes of the experiment in eqn. (4) were
represented by one dimensional projection operators, the event b1 ∨ b2 would
be represented by a sum of orthogonal projectors which commutes with the
remaining projectors; a similar relation (coexistence) holds if the outcomes are
represented by POV elements (effects), Busch et al. (1996).)
Thus we see that the explicit argument fails. There may remain, however,
a certain intuitive one. Brukner and Zeilinger are perhaps suggesting that we
miss something importantly quantum by using the Shannon information as its
derivation is restricted to the case of commuting observables. Or rather (since we
have seen that the grouping axiom does not explicitly refer to joint experiments
and we know that it is not in fact necessary for the functioning of the Shannon
information as a measure of uncertainty anyway), because it can only tell us
5To see that the standard case and the joint experiment case are mathematically distinct,
note that the joint experiment formalism cannot express the situation in which B events only
happen if the an event occurs. For that we would require that p(an) = p(b1)+p(b2), but then
the marginal distribution for B outcomes in the joint experiment does not sum to unity as is
required for a well defined joint experiment,
∑
i p(bi) = p(an) 6= 1 in general.
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about the uncertainty in joint experiments for mutually commuting observables
rather than the full set of observables. However, when we recall that a measure
of uncertainty is a measure of the spread of a probability distribution, we see
that this simply amounts to the truism that one cannot have a measure of
the spread of a joint probability distribution unless one actually has a joint
probability distribution, and it in no way implies that there is anything un-
quantum about the Shannon information itself.
The fact that joint probability distributions cannot be defined for all possi-
ble groupings of experiments that we might consider does not tell us anything
about whether a certain quantity is a good or bad measure of uncertainty for
probability distributions that can be defined (e.g. any probability distribution
derived from a quantum state by the trace rule, or conditional probabilities
given by the Lu¨ders rule). We must be careful not to confuse the question of
what makes a good measure of uncertainty with the question of when a joint
probability distribution can be defined.
We already know that a function of a joint probability distribution cannot
be a way of telling us how much we know, or how uncertain we are, in general
when we know the state of a system, because we know that a joint probability
distribution for all possible measurements does not exist. It is for this reason in
quantum mechanics that we introduce measures of mixedness such as the von
Neumann entropy, which are functions of the state rather than of a probability
distribution. It is not a failing of the Shannon information as a measure of
uncertainty or expected information gain that it does not fulfil the same role.
Part of Brukner and Zeilinger’s worry about the Shannon information thus
seems to arise because they are trying to treat it too much like a measure of
mixedness, a measure of how uncertain we are in general when we know the
state of a quantum system6.
6This is illustrated for example in their reply to criticism of their grouping axiom ar-
gument by Hall (Brukner and Zeilinger 2000b, Hall 2000). Hall presents an interpretation
of the grouping axiom concerning the increase in randomness on mixing of non-overlapping
distributions, to which Brukner and Zeilinger’s worries about joint experiments would not
apply. Their reply, in essence, is that the density matrix cannot be simultaneously diagonal
in non-commuting bases, therefore it cannot be thought to be composed of non-overlapping
classical distributions, hence Hall’s grouping axiom will not apply, further supporting their
original claim that the Shannon measure is tied to the notion of classical properties. What
this reply in fact establishes, however, is that Hall’s axiom applied to mixtures of classical
distributions is not relevant to characterising the randomness of the density matrix ; but this
is something with which everyone would agree, and this job certainly not one for which the
Shannon information is intended. (If we did wish to use the grouping axiom in characterising
the randomness of the density matrix, we would apply Hall’s version to mixtures of density
operators with orthogonal support; this would then pick out the von Neumann entropy up to
a constant factor (Wehrl 1978).)
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4 Brukner and Zeilinger’s ‘Total information con-
tent’
The final argument proposed against the Shannon information is that it is not
appropriately related to a notion of ‘total information content’ for a quantum
system. It is also suggested that the von Neumann entropy, which has a natural
relation to the Shannon information, is not a measure of information content as
it makes no explicit reference to information gain from measurements in general
(Brukner and Zeilinger 2001, 2000b).
In place of the Shannon information, Brukner and Zeilinger propose the
quantity
I(~p) = N
n∑
i=1
(
pi − 1
n
)2
, (5)
from which they derive their notion of total information content as follows:
A set of measurements is called mutually unbiased or complementary
(Schwinger 1960) if the sets of projectors {P}, {Q} associated with any pair
of measurement bases satisfy Tr(PQ) = 1/n, where n is the dimensionality of
the system. There can exist at most n+1 such bases (Wootters and Fields 1989),
constituting a complete set, and as was shown by Ivanovic (1981), measurement
of such a complete set on an ensemble of similarly prepared systems determines
their density matrix ρ completely. In analogy to acquiring the information as-
sociated with a (pointlike) classical system by learning its state (determining
its position in phase space), Brukner and Zeilinger then suggest that the total
information content of a quantum system should be given by a sum of informa-
tion measures for a complete set of mutually unbiased measurements. Taking
I(~p) as the measure of information, the result is a unitarily invariant quantity:
Itot =
n+1∑
j=1
I(~pj) =
∑
ji
(
pji −
1
n
)2
= Tr
(
ρ− 1
n
)2
. (6)
This also provides their argument against the Shannon information. It is
a necessary constraint on a measure of total information content, they argue,
that it be unitarily invariant, but substituting H(~p) for I(~p) in (6) does not
result in a unitarily invariant quantity, that is, we do not have a sum to a ‘to-
tal information content’. Let us call the requirement that a measure sum to a
unitarily invariant quantity for a complete set of mutually unbiased measure-
ments the ‘total information constraint’. The suggestion is that the Shannon
measure is inadequate as a measure of information gain because it does not
satisfy the total information constraint and hence does not tell us how much of
the total information content of a system we learn by performing measurements
in a given basis. Similarly, the complaint against the von Neumann entropy is
that it is merely a measure of mixedness, as unlike Itot, it has no relation to
the information gained in a measurement unless we happen to measure in the
eigenbasis of ρ.
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A few remarks are in order. First, I(~p) and Itot are not unfamiliar expres-
sions. The quantity
∑
i(pi− 1/n)2 is one of the class of measures of the concen-
tration of a probability distribution given by Uffink (1990), and Fano (1957),
for example, remarks that Tr(ρ2) can serve as a good measure of information;
furthermore, the relation expressed in eqn. (6) has previously been employed by
Larsen (1990) in discussing exact uncertainty relations. Note also that I(~p) is
an increasing function of the concentration of a probability distribution, hence
a measure of how much we know given a probability distribution, rather than
being a measure of uncertainty like H(~p); similarly Itot is an increasing function
of the purity of ρ.
More importantly, however, ‘information content’ might mean several differ-
ent things. It may not, then, be reasonable to require that every meaningful
information measure sum to a unitarily invariant quantity that can be inter-
preted as an information content. Moreover, we may well ask why information
measures for a complete set of mutually unbiased measurements should be ex-
pected to sum to any particularly interesting quantity. That the measure I(~p)
happens to sum to a unitarily invariant quantity is, as we shall presently see,
the consequence of a geometric property tangential to its role as a measure of
information.
4.1 Some Different Notions of Information Content
It is useful to distinguish between the information encoded in a system, the
information required to specify the state of a system (more precisely, the infor-
mation required to specify a sequence of states drawn from a given ensemble)
and states of complete and less than complete knowledge or information. Each
of these can serve as a notion of information content in an appropriate context.
In the classical case, their differences can be largely ignored, but in the quantum
case there are important divergences. It is, for instance, necessary to introduce
the concept of the accessible information to characterise the difference between
information encoded and specification information (Schumacher 1995).
If we consider encoding the outputs ai of a classical information source A
into pure states |ai〉 of an ensemble of quantum systems, then the state of the
ensemble will be given by ρ =
∑
i p(ai)|ai〉〈ai|. The von Neumann entropy,
S(ρ) = −Trρ log ρ, is a measure of how mixed this state is, giving us one sense
of information content - the more mixed a state, the less information we have
about what the outcome of measurements on systems described by the state
will be7.
If we are presented with a sequence of systems drawn from an ensemble
prepared in this manner, each will be in one of the pure states, and the number
of bits per system required to specify this sequence will beH(A), the information
7Mixed states are also sometimes said to be states of less than complete information due
to a lack of information about the way a system was prepared, represented by a probability
distibution over possible pure states. Our reading is to be preferred given the many-one
relation of preparation procedures to density operators and the fact that density operators
can also result from tracing out unwanted degrees of freedom.
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of the classical source (which will be greater than S(ρ) unless we have coded
in orthogonal states). This is the specification information, also the amount of
information required to prepare the sequence. For the amount of information
that has actually been encoded into the systems, however, we need to consider
measurements on the ensemble and the Shannon mutual information H(A : B).
As already remarked (Section 3.1), if we encode using a certain basis (our
|ai〉 form an orthonormal set) and we measure in a different basis, then H(A :
B) < H(A); quantum ‘noise’ reduces the amount we can decode. More signifi-
cantly, if we have coded in non-orthogonal states (if, for example the number of
outputs of our classical source is greater than the dimensionality of our quan-
tum systems), then no measurement can distinguish these states perfectly and
we cannot recover the complete classical information. Taking ‘encoded’ to be a
‘success’ word (something cannot be said to have been encoded if it cannot in
principle be decoded), then the maximum amount of information encoded in a
system is given by the accessible information, the maximum over all decoding
observables of the mutual information. Using non-orthogonal coding states, the
amount we can encode is less than the specification information. A well known
result due to Holevo (1973) provides an upper bound on the mutual information
resulting from measurement of any observable (including POV measurements).
For the general case of encoding states ρai , this is given by
H(A : B) ≤ S(ρ)−
∑
i
p(ai)S(ρai),
which in the case we are considering of pure encoding states, reduces to H(A :
B) ≤ S(ρ). This provides a very strong sense in which the von Neumann entropy
does give us a notion of the total information content of a quantum system —
it is the maximum amount that can actually be encoded in the system.
Brukner and Zeilinger do not consider a quantum communication channel
but are concerned rather with the information content of a single system con-
sidered in isolation. This information content is supposed to relate to how much
we learn from learning the state, but if the system is being treated in isolation
then by learning its state we are not acquiring a certain amount of information
in virtue of the state being drawn from a given ensemble, as in the standard
notion of information. (Hence their analogy with gaining the information con-
tent of a classical system fails to hold.) In fact, their ‘total information content’
seems best interpreted as a measure of mixedness analogous to the von Neumann
entropy.
When introduced (Brukner and Zeilinger 1999), the information measure
I(~p) is presented as a measure of how much we know about what the outcome
of a particular experiment will be, given the state. The total information of the
state, then, would seem to be a measure of how much we know in general about
what the outcomes of experiments will be given the state; and this is precisely
a question of the degree of mixedness of the state8.
8Recently it has been noted that Itot is also related to the average distance of our estimate
of the unknown state from the true state (measured in the Hilbert-Schmidt norm), given
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4.1.1 Measures of mixedness
The functioning of measures of mixedness can usefully be approached via the
notions of majorization and Schur convexity (concavity). The majorization
relation ≺ imposes a pre-order on probability distributions (Uffink 1990, Nielsen
2001). A probability distribution ~q is majorized by ~p, ~q ≺ ~p, iff qi =
∑
j Sijpj ,
where Sij is a doubly stochastic matrix. That is (via Birkhoff’s theorem), if ~q
is a mixture of permutations of ~p. Thus if ~q ≺ ~p, then ~q is a more mixed or
disordered distribution than ~p.
Schur convex (concave) functions respect the ordering of the majorization
relation: a function f is Schur convex if, if ~q ≺ ~p then f(~q) ≤ f(~p), and Schur
concave if, if ~q ≺ ~p then f(~q) ≥ f(~p) (for strictly Schur convex(cave) functions,
equality holds only if ~q and ~p are permutations of one another). This explains
the utility of such functions as measures of the concentration and uncertainty
of probability distributions, respectively.
The majorization relation will apply equally to the vectors of eigenvalues of
density matrices. It can be shown that the vector of eigenvalues ~λ′ of the density
matrix ρ′ of the post measurement ensemble for a (non-selective) projective
measurement is majorized by the vector of eigenvalues ~λ of the pre-measurement
state ρ (Nielsen 2001). (If we measure in the eigenbasis of ρ, then there is,
of course, no change in the eigenvalues). The λ′i are just the probabilities of
the different outcomes of the measurement in question, thus the probability
distribution for the outcomes of any given measurement will be more disordered
or spread than the eigenvalues of ρ.
If we take any Schur concave function we know to be a measure of uncer-
tainty, for instance the Shannon information H(~p), and ~p is the probability
distribution for measurement outcomes, we then know that H(~p) ≥ H(~λ), for
any projective measurement we might perform. This explains whyH(~λ) = S(ρ),
a measure of mixedness, is a measure of how much we know given the state:
the more mixed a state, the more uncertain we must be about the outcome
of any given measurement. Similarly, if we take a measure of the concentra-
tion of a probability distribution, a Schur convex function such as I(~p), then
we know that for any measurement with outcome probability distribution ~p,
I(~p) ≤ I(~λ) = Itot; and this explains why Itot is a measure of how much we
know given ρ: the less the value of Itot, the less able we are to predict the
outcome of any given experiment.
Brukner and Zeilinger would of course deny that their total information
content is merely a measure of mixedness. The argument that it is more than
this rests on the satisfaction of the total information constraint, the relation
between the measure of information I(~p) and Itot for a complete set of mutually
unbiased measurements as expressed in eqn. (6). We shall now see that this
only a finite number N of experiments in each mutually unbiased basis (Rehacek and Hradil
2002). This seems best understood as indicating that the mean error in our state estimation
is inversely related to N , with a constant of proportionality that depends on the dimension of
the system and the mixedness of the state. In any case, Brukner and Zeilinger are primarily
interested in how much we know when the state has been determined to arbitrary accuracy.
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relation can be given a simple geometric explanation using the Hilbert-Schmidt
representation of density operators.
4.2 The Relation between Total Information Content and
I(~p)
The set of complex n × n Hermitian matrices forms an n2-dimensional real
Hilbert space Vh(C
n) on which we have defined an inner product (A,B) =
Tr(AB);A,B ∈ Vh(Cn) and a norm ‖A‖ =
√
Tr(A2) (Fano 1957; Wichmann
1963). The density matrix ρ of an n dimensional quantum system can be rep-
resented as a vector in this space. The requirements on ρ of unit trace and
positivity imply that the tip of any such vector must lie in the n2 − 1 dimen-
sional hyperplane T a distance 1/
√
n from the origin and perpendicular to the
unit operator 1, and on or within a hypersphere of radius one centred on the
origin.
It is useful to introduce a set of basis operators on our space; we require
n2 linearly independent operators Ui ∈ Vh(Cn) and it may be useful to require
orthogonality: Tr(UiUj) = const. × δij . Any operator on the system can then
be expanded in terms of this basis and in particular, ρ can be written as
ρ =
1
n
+
n2−1∑
i=1
Tr(ρUi)Ui,
where we have chosen U0 = 1 to take care of the trace condition.
Evidently, ρ may be determined experimentally by finding the expectation
values of the n2 − 1 operators Ui in the state ρ. If we include the operator 1 in
our basis set, then the idempotent projectors associated with measurement of
any maximal (non-degenerate) observable will provide a maximum of a further
n− 1 linearly independent operators. Obtaining the probability distribution for
a given maximal observable will thus provide n− 1 of the parameters required
to determine the state, and the minimum number of measurements of maximal
observables that will be needed in total is n + 1, if each observable provides a
full complement of linearly independent projectors.
Each such set of projectors spans an n−1 dimensional hyperplane in Vh(Cn)
and their expectation values specify the projection of the state ρ into this hyper-
plane. Ivanovic (1981) noted that projectors P,Q belonging to any two different
mutually unbiased bases will be orthogonal in T , hence the hyperplanes associ-
ated with measurement of mutually unbiased observables are orthogonal in the
space in which density operators are constrained to lie in virtue of the trace
condition. If n + 1 mutually unbiased observables can be found, then, Vh(C
n)
can be decomposed into orthogonal subspaces given by the one dimensional
subspace spanned by 1 and the n + 1 subspaces associated with the mutually
unbiased observables. The state ρ can then be expressed as:
ρ =
1
n
+
n+1∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
qji P¯
j
i , (7)
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where P¯ ji = P
j
i −1/n is the projection onto T of the ith idempotent projector in
the jth mutually unbiased basis set, and qji = (p
j
i−1/n) is the expectation value
of this operator in the state ρ. For a given value of j, the vectors P¯i span an
(n−1) dimensional orthogonal subspace and the square of the length of a vector
expressed in the form (7) lying in subspace j will be given by
∑n
i=1(q
j
i )
2 = I(~pj).
The geometrical explanation of Itot is then simply as follows. Tr(ρ
2) is the
square of the length of ρ in Vh(C
n) and Tr(ρ−1/n)2 is the square of the distance
of ρ from the maximally mixed state (the length squared of ρ in T ). This squared
length will just be the sum of the squares of the lengths of the components of
the vector ρ− 1/n in the orthogonal subspaces into which we have decomposed
Vh(C
n), i.e. it will be given by
∑
ji(q
j
i )
2. This is what eqn. (6) reports and it
explains how Itot and I(~p) satisfy the total information constraint.
Thus we see that if Itot differs from being a simple measure of mixedness,
then that is because it is a measure of length also; and this explains why it can
be given by a sum of quantities I(~p) for a complete set of mutually unbiased
measurements. As measures of how much we know given the state, however, Itot
and S(ρ) bear the same relation to their appropriate measures of information,
as we saw in the previous section. Equally, as measures of information, H(~p)
stands to S(ρ) in the same relation as I(~p) to Itot. Itot is the upper bound on
the amount we can know about the outcome of a measurement as measured by
I(~p); S(ρ) is the lower bound on our uncertainty about what the outcome of a
measurement will be, as measured by H(~p).
The complaint against the Shannon information was supposed to be that
as H(~p) fails to satisfy the total information constraint, it does not tell us
the information gained from a particular measurement; the complaint against
the von Neumann entropy that as S(ρ) is not given by a sum of measures for a
complete set of mutually unbiased measurements, it is not suitably related to the
information gained from a measurement. However, we can now see that insisting
on the total information constraint in this way is tantamount to insisting that
only a function which measures the length of the component of ρ lying in a
given hyperplane can be a measure of information, and correlatively, that the
only viable notion of total information content is a measure of the length of ρ
in Vh(C
n). But H(~p) can be a perfectly good measure of information without
having to be a measure of the length of the projection of ρ into the subspace
associated with an observable; and as we have just seen, S(ρ) does have an
explicit relation to the information gain from measurement that justifies its
interpretation as a total information content. A relation, moreover, that Itot
also possesses and which serves to justify its interpretation as a measure of how
much we know given the state.
Hence our conclusion must be that the total information constraint is not a
reasonable requirement on measures of information.
Of course, H(~p) does not tell us the information gain on measurement it we
take, as Brukner and Zeilinger seem to, ‘the information encoded in a basis’
simply to mean the length squared of the component of the state lying in the
measurement hyperplane; but this is a non-standard usage. H(~p) certainly re-
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mains a measure of our expected information gain from performing a particular
measurement (how much the outcome will surprise us, on average, given that
we have the probability distribution); and if we are interested in the amount
of information encoded, in the usual sense of the word, that can be decoded
using a particular measurement, i.e. if we have a string of systems into which
information has actually been encoded, then we may always just consider the
Shannon mutual information associated with that measurement. (The ‘total
information’ associated with this quantity will then be given, via the Holevo
bound, as the von Neumann entropy.)
5 Conclusion
Of the three arguments that Brukner and Zeilinger have presented against the
Shannon information, we have seen that the first two fail outright. These ar-
guments sought to establish that the notion of the Shannon information is un-
dermined in the quantum context due to a reliance on classical concepts. With
regard to the first we saw that, contrary to Brukner and Zeilinger, the existence
of a pre-determined string is neither necessary nor sufficient for the interpreta-
tion of H(~p) as a measure of information, hence the absence of such a string
would not cause any problems for the Shannon information in quantum me-
chanics.
The objective of their second argument was to highlight classical assump-
tions in the grouping axiom that would prevent the axiomatic derivation of the
Shannon information going through in the quantum case. This argument turned
out to be based on an erroneous reading of the grouping axiom that appeals
to joint experiments. The grouping axiom is in fact perfectly well defined in
the quantum case and the standard axiomatic derivation of the form of H(~p)
can indeed go through. The grouping axiom does not reveal any problematic
classical assumptions implicit in the Shannon information.
In their final argument, Brukner and Zeilinger suggest that defining the
notion of the total information content of a quantum system in terms of the
Shannon information would lead to a quantity with the unnatural property of
unitary non-invariance. But this is not a compelling argument against the Shan-
non quantity as a measure of information. We have seen that it is not a necessary
requirement on every meaningful measure of information that it sum to a uni-
tarily invariant quantity for a complete set of mutually unbiased measurements;
nor, conversely, is it necessary that every viable notion of total information
content be given by such a sum of individual measures of information.
Brukner and Zeilinger’s arguments thus fail to establish that the Shannon
information involves any particularly classical assumptions or that there is any
difficulty in the application of the Shannon measure to measurements on quan-
tum systems. The Shannon information is perfectly well defined and appropriate
as a measure of information in the quantum context as well as in the classical.
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A Appendix: Zeilinger’s Foundational Principle
As remarked in the introduction, Brukner and Zeilinger’s discussion of the Shan-
non information follows on from Zeilinger’s (1999) proposal of an information-
theoretic foundational principle for quantum mechanics. This principle, he sug-
gests, is to play a role in quantum mechanics similar to that of the Principle
of Relativity in Special Relativity, or to the Principle of Equivalence in Gen-
eral Relativity. Like these, the Foundational Principle is to be an intuitively
understandable principle which plays a key role in deriving the structure of the
theory. In particular, Zeilinger suggests that the Foundational Principle pro-
vides an explanation for the irreducible randomness in quantum measurement
and for the phenomenon of entanglement. For discussion of how the Founda-
tional Principle motivates the arguments against the Shannon information, see
Timpson (2002); in this Appendix we shall consider whether the Principle can
indeed be successful as a foundational principle for quantum mechanics.
Before stating the Foundational Principle, it is helpful to identify two philo-
sophical assumptions that Zeilinger’s position incorporates. The first is a form
of phenomenalism: physical objects are taken not to exist in and of themselves,
but to be mere constructs relating sense impressions (Zeilinger 1999:633)9; the
second assumption is an explicit instrumentalism about the quantum state:
The initial state...represents all our information as obtained by ear-
lier observation...[the time evolved] state is just a short-hand way
of representing the outcomes of all possible future observations.
(Zeilinger 1999:634)
With these assumptions noted, let us consider the two distinct formulations of
the Principle presented in Zeilinger (1999):
FP 1 An elementary system represents the truth value of one proposition.
FP 2 An elementary system carries one bit of information.
At first glance, these two statements appear most naturally to be concerned
with the amount of information that can be encoded into a physical system.
However, this interpretation is at odds with the passage in which Zeilinger
motivates the Foundational Principle. In this passage, his concern is with the
number of propositions required to describe a system. He considers the analysis
of a composite system into constituent parts and remarks that it is natural
to assume that each constituent system will require fewer propositions for its
description than the composite does. The end point of the analysis will be
reached when we have systems described by a single proposition only; and it is
these systems that are termed ‘elementary’.
The situation is clarified when Zeilinger goes on to explain what he means
by an elementary system carrying or representing some information:
9Here I take phenomenalism to be the doctrine that the subject matter of all conceiv-
able propositions are one’s own actual or possible experiences, or the actual and possible
experiences of another.
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...that a system “represents” the truth value of a proposition or
that it “carries” one bit of information only implies a statement
concerning what can be said about possible measurement results.
(Zeilinger 1999:635)
Thus the Foundational Principle is not a constraint on how much information
can be encoded into a physical system. It is a constraint on how much the state
of an elementary system can say about the results of measurement. This inter-
pretation is rendered consistent with the discussion in terms of the propositions
required to describe a system, as from Zeilinger’s instrumentalist point of view,
describing (the state of) a quantum system can only be to make a claim about
future possible measurement results. Furthermore, we can understand the pe-
culiar idiom of a system ‘representing’ some information, where this is taken
not to refer to the encoding of some information into a system, when we recall
that from the point of view of Zeilinger’s phenomenalism, a physical system is
not an actual thing. On his view, a system represents a quantity of information
about measurement results because a physical system literally is nothing more
than an agglomeration of actual and possible sense impressions arising from
observations.
In short, however, it seems that a clearer, and perhaps more philosophically
neutral, statement of the Foundational Principle would be the following:
FP 3 The state of an elementary system specifies the answer to a single yes/no
experimental question,
where we have used the fact that by ‘proposition’ Zeilinger means something that
represents an experimental question. With this relatively clear statement of the
Foundational Principle in hand, let us now consider its claims as a foundational
principle for quantum mechanics.
To begin with, we should note the limitations implied by Zeilinger’s con-
ception of the description of a system. It might not always be the case that
the state of an individual system can be characterised appropriately as a list of
experimental questions to which answers are specified; and in such a case, the
terms of the Foundational Principle cannot be set up. Consider the de Broglie-
Bohm theory, for example, with its elements of holism and contextuality — even
though the theory is deterministic, the results of measurements are in general
not determined by the properties of the object system alone but are the result
of interaction between object system and measuring device. It would seem that
this theory could neither be supported nor ruled out by the Foundational Prin-
ciple, as we can neither identify something that would count as an elementary
system in this theory, given the way ‘elementary system’ has been defined, nor,
a fortiori, begin to enumerate how many experimental questions such an entity
might specify. However, for present purposes, let us put this sort of worry to
one side.
Another concern arises when considering the distinction we have drawn be-
tween describing a system and encoding information into it. Unlike encoding,
the notion of describing a system presupposes a certain language in which the
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description is made, and the description of a given system could be longer or
shorter depending on the conceptual resources of the language used. If we are to
make a claim about the number of propositions required to describe a system,
then, as we must when identifying an elementary system to figure in the Foun-
dational Principle, we must already have made a choice of the set of concepts
with which to describe the system. But this is worrying if the purpose of the
Foundational Principle is to serve as a basis from which the structure of our
theory is to be derived. If we already have to make substantial assumptions
about the correct terms in which the objects of the theory are to be described,
then it may be that the Foundational Principle will be debarred from serving
its foundational purpose. With this worry in mind, let us now consider the
first of the concrete claims for the Foundational Principle, that it explains the
irreducible randomness of quantum measurements.
Zeilinger’s suggestion is that we have randomness in quantum mechanics
because:
...an elementary system cannot carry enough information to provide
definite answers to all questions that could be asked experimentally
(Zeilinger 1999:636),
and this randomness must be irreducible, because if it were reduced to hid-
den properties, then the system would carry more than one bit of information.
Unfortunately, this does not constitute an explanation of randomness, even if
we have granted the existence of elementary systems and adopted the Founda-
tional Principle. For the following question remains: why is it that experimental
questions exist whose outcome is not already determined by a specification of
the finest grained state description we can offer? How is it that any space for
randomness remains? Or again, why isn’t one bit enough? The point is, it
has not been explained why the state of an elementary system cannot specify
an answer to all experimental questions: this does not in fact appear to fol-
low from the Foundational Principle. The Foundational Principle says nothing
about the structure of the set of experimental questions, yet this turns out to
be all-important.
Consider the case of a classical Ising model spin, which has only two possible
states, ‘up’ or ‘down’; here one bit, the specification of an answer to a single
experimental question (‘Is it up?’) is enough to specify an answer to all questions
that could be asked. There is no space for randomness here, yet this classical
case is perfectly consistent with the Foundational Principle. Thus it seems that
no explanation of randomness is forthcoming from the Foundational Principle
and furthermore, it is far from clear that the Principle, on its own, in fact allows
us to distinguish between quantum and classical.
Of course, if one assumes that experimental questions are represented in
the quantum way, as projectors on a Hilbert space, then even for the simplest
non-trivial state space, there will be non-equivalent experimental questions, the
answer to one of which will not provide an answer to another; but we cannot
assume this structure if it is the very structure that we are trying to derive.
It appears from the way in which the Foundational Principle is supposed to be
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functioning in the attempted explanation of randomness, that something like the
quantum structure of propositions is being assumed. But this is clearly fatal to
the prospects of the Foundational Principle as a foundational principle.10
Does the Principle fare any better with the proposed explanation of entan-
glement? The idea here is to consider N elementary systems, which, following
from the Foundational Principle, will have N bits of information associated
with them. The suggestion is that entanglement results when all N bits are
exhausted in specifying joint properties of the system, leaving none for individ-
ual subsystems (Zeilinger 1999), or more generally, when more information is
used up in specifying joint properties than would be possible classically. The
underlying thought is that this approach captures the intuitive idea that when
we have an entangled system, we know more about the joint system (which may
be in a pure state) than we do about the individual sub-systems (which must be
mixed states). The proposal is further developed in (Brukner et al 2001), where
Brukner and Zeilinger’s information measure is used to provide a quantitative
condition for N qubits to be unentangled, which is then related to a condition
for the violation of a certain N -party Bell inequality.
To give a basic example of how the idea is supposed to work, consider the
case of two qubits. Recall that the maximally entangled Bell states are joint
eigenstates of the observables σx ⊗ σx and σy ⊗ σy. From the Foundational
Principle, only two bits of information are associated with our two systems, i.e.
the states of these systems can specify the answer to two experimental questions
only. If the two questions whose answers are specified are ‘Are both spins in the
same direction along x?’ (1/2(1⊗1+σx⊗σx)) and ‘Are both spins in the same
direction along y?’ (1/2(1⊗ 1 + σy ⊗ σy)), then we end up with a maximally
entangled state. If, by contrast, the two questions had been ‘Are both spins in
the same direction along x?’ and ‘Is the spin of particle 1 up along x?’, the
information would not have all been used up specifying joint properties and we
would have instead a product state (joint eigenstate of σx ⊗ σx and σx ⊗ 1).
Now, although this idea may have its attractions when used as a criterion for
entanglement within quantum mechanics, it does not succeed in providing an
explanation for the phenomenon of entanglement, which was the original claim.
If we return to the starting point and consider our N elementary systems,
all that the Foundational Principle tells us regarding these systems is that their
individual states specify the answer to a single yes/no question concerning each
system individually. There is, as yet, no suggestion of how this relates to joint
properties of the combined system. Some assumption needs to be made before
we can go further. For instance, we need to enquire whether there are supposed
to be experimental questions regarding the joint system which can be posed and
answered that are not equivalent to questions and answers for the systems taken
individually. (We know that this will be the case, given the structure of quantum
10In a sense, we could say that Zeilinger’s explanation of randomness is problematic because
it fails to explain why the state space of quantum mechanics is so gratuitously large from
the point of view of storing information (Caves and Fuchs 1996). It is then striking that
this attempted information-theoretic foundational approach to quantum mechanics has not
allowed for one of the significant insights vouchsafed by quantum information theory.
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mechanics, but we are not allowed to assume this structure, if we are engaged
in a foundational project.11) If this is the case then there can be a difference in
the information associated with correlations (i.e., regarding answers to questions
about joint properties) and the information regarding individual properties. But
then we need to ask: why is it that there exist sets of experimental questions
to which the assignment of truth values is not equivalent to an assignment of
truth values to experimental questions regarding individual systems?
Because such sets of questions exist, more information can be ‘in the cor-
relations’ than in individual properties. Stating that there is more information
in correlations than in individual properties is then to report that such sets of
non-equivalent questions exist, but it does not explain why they do so. However,
it is surely this that demands explanation — why is it not simply the case that
all truth value assignments to experimental questions are reducible to truth
value assignments to experimental questions regarding individual properties, as
they are in the classical case? That is, why does entanglement exist? In the
absence of an answer to the question when posed in this manner, the suggested
explanation following from the Foundational Principle seems dangerously close
to the vacuous claim that entanglement results when the quantum state of the
joint system is not a separable state.
Of course, if we are in the business of looking within quantum mechanics
and asking how product and entangled states differ, then it is indeed legitimate
to consider something like the condition Brukner et al. (2001) propose; and we
can then consider how good this condition is as a criterion for entanglement12.
But as mentioned before, if we are trying to explain the existence of entan-
glement then we cannot simply assume the quantum mechanical structure of
experimental questions.
Let us close by considering a final striking passage. Zeilinger suggests that
the Foundational Principle might provide an answer to Wheeler’s question ‘Why
the quantum?’ (Wheeler 1990) in a way congenial to the Bohrian intuition that
the structure of quantum theory is a consequence of limitations on what can be
said about the world:
The most fundamental viewpoint here is that the quantum is a con-
sequence of what can be said about the world. Since what can be said
has to be expressed in propositions and since the most elementary
statement is a single proposition, quantization follows if the most
elementary system represents just a single proposition. (Zeilinger
1999:642)
But this passage contains a crucial non-sequitur. Quantization only follows if
11To illustrate, a simultaneous truth value assignment for the experiments σx ⊗ σx and
σy ⊗ σy cannot be reduced to one for experiments of the form 1⊗ a.σ,b.σ⊗ 1.
12At this point it is worth noting that there have been other discussions of entanglement
which develop the intuitive idea that when faced with entangled states, we know more about
joint properties than individual properties. A very general framework is presented by Nielsen
and Kempe (2001), who use the majorization relation to compare the spectra of the global
and reduced states of the system; a necessary condition for a state to be separable is then
that it be more disordered globally than locally.
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the propositions are projection operators on a complex Hilbert space. And why
is it that the world has to be described that way? That is the question that
would need to be answered in answering Wheeler’s question; and it is a question
which, I suggest, the Foundational Principle goes no way towards answering.
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